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Abstract
This study explores the macroeconomics e¤ects of labor unions in a two-country model of
directed technical change in which the market size of each country determines the incentives
for innovation. We nd that an increase in the bargaining power of a wage-oriented union
leads to a decrease in employment in the domestic economy. This result has two important
implications on innovation. First, it reduces the rates of innovation and economic growth.
Second, it causes innovation to be directed to the foreign economy, which in turn causes a
negative e¤ect on domestic wages relative to foreign wages in the long run. We also calibrate
our model to data in the US and the UK to explore the quantitative implications of labor
unions on social welfare and wage inequality across countries. Our calibrated model is able
to explain about half of the decrease in relative wage between the US and the UK from
1980 to 2007. Furthermore, as a result of the decrease in unionsbargaining power, welfare
improves in the two countries. The welfare gains are equivalent to a permanent increase in
consumption of 5.4% in the US and 8.3% in the UK.
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1 Introduction
This study explores the macroeconomics e¤ects of labor unions in an open-economy model of di-
rected technical change. We consider a two-country model in which the market size of each country
determines the incentives for innovation. By featuring labor unions that bargain with employers
over wages and employment, our model di¤ers from other models of directed technical change in
the literature; see for example Acemoglu (1998, 2002, 2003), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), Gancia
and Bonglioli (2008) and Gancia and Zilibotti (2009). Within this growth-theoretic framework,
we nd that an increase in the bargaining power of a wage-oriented union leads to a decrease
in employment in the domestic economy. In contrast, an increase in the bargaining power of an
employment-oriented union leads to an increase in employment. Empirical studies1 often nd that
increasing the degree of unionization has a negative e¤ect on employment, which is consistent with
our result under a wage-oriented union. This result has two important implications on innovation.
First, by decreasing employment, an increase in the bargaining power of a wage-oriented union
reduces the rates of innovation and economic growth. This theoretical implication is consistent
with empirical studies that nd negative e¤ects of unions on innovation and growth.2 Second, by
decreasing employment and the market size of the domestic economy, an increase in the bargaining
power of a wage-oriented union causes innovation to be directed to the foreign economy, which in
turn causes a negative long-run e¤ect on domestic wages relative to foreign wages. In the long run,
this negative e¤ect of directed technical change on relative wage income across countries would
dominate the positive e¤ect of labor unions on wages if the elasticity of substitution between
domestic and foreign goods is su¢ ciently large.
We also calibrate our model to data in the US and the UK to provide a quantitative analysis.
Figure 1a plots the HP-ltered trends of labor income share of GDP from 1980 to 2007 in the US
and the UK.3 This gure shows a well-documented stylized fact that the labor share of income has
gradually declined since the early 1980s. Figure 1b plots the HP-ltered trends of unemployment
rates in the two countries.4 This gure shows that unemployment has also gradually declined in
these two countries until 2007.5 We calibrate our model to compute the degree of unionswage
orientation and the decrease in their bargaining power that enable the model to replicate this
simultaneous decrease in labor income share and unemployment in the two countries. We nd
that the degree of unionswage orientation must be stronger in the UK than in the US in order
for the calibrated economies to match the data. We also explore the quantitative implications
on social welfare and wage inequality across the two countries. Our calibrated model is able to
explain about half of the decrease in relative wage between the US and the UK from 1980 to 2007.
Furthermore, we nd that both countries gain from the decrease in unionsbargaining power, but
the welfare improvement in the UK is greater than that in the US due to changes in relative wage
income. Specically, the welfare gains are equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption of
1See for example Montgomery (1989), Blanchower et al. (1991), Nickell and Layard (1999) and Krol and
Svorny (2007).
2See for example Connolly et al. (1986), Hirsch and Link (1987), Acs and Audretsch (1988), Carmeci and
Mauro (2003) and Bradley et al. (2013). In contrast, Schnabel and Wagner (1994) and Addison et al. (2001) nd
positive e¤ects of unions on innovation and growth in Germany, which would be consistent with our results under
an employment-oriented union.
3Data source: OECD Annual Indicators on Unit Labour Costs.
4Data source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics, and UK O¢ ce for National Statistics.
5We do not consider data after 2007 because of the nancial crisis.
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5.4% in the US and 8.3% in the UK.
Figure 1a Figure 1b
This study relates to the literature on labor unions. Early studies in this literature focus on the
formulation of labor unionsobjective function; see for example Oswald (1985) for a survey. We
follow a common approach in the literature to specify a Stone-Geary union objective function over
wages and employment. Pemberton (1988) provides a microeconomic foundation for this union
objective function as "the outcome of an internal bargain between the leadership and membership"
in a managerial union. Our study relates most closely to a recent branch of this literature that
explores the e¤ects of labor unions on innovation and economic growth. Palokangas (1996) is
the seminal study in this branch of the literature. Subsequent studies, such as Palokangas (2000,
2004, 2005), Boone (2000) and Chang et al. (2014), also analyze the e¤ects of labor unions
in R&D-based growth models. Palokangas (1996, 2000, 2004, 2005) nds that increasing the
bargaining power of labor union serves to increase economic growth, whereas Boone (2000) nds
that labor union dampens economic growth. Chang et al. (2014) nd that labor union has both
a negative growth e¤ect via unemployment and a positive growth e¤ect via endogenous market
structure, and these two e¤ects exactly o¤set each other leaving an overall neutral e¤ect on growth.
Our theoretical model is able to replicate (via an alternative mechanism) the above results that
increasing the bargaining power of labor unions can have a positive e¤ect on growth and innovation
(under an employment-oriented union), a negative e¤ect on growth and innovation (under a wage-
oriented union) and a neutral e¤ect on growth and innovation (when the union is neither wage
nor employment oriented).6 In addition to analyzing the e¤ects of labor unions on the level of
innovation within an economy as is common in the literature,7 our study also explores the e¤ects of
labor unions on the direction of innovation and wage inequality across countries, complementing
the abovementioned studies in the literature. Furthermore, unlike previous studies that focus
on qualitative analysis, we calibrate our model to aggregate data to explore the quantitative
implications of labor unions on the macroeconomy. An interesting study by Acemoglu et al.
6Chang et al. (2007) also nd that unionswage orientation determines the e¤ects of their bargaining power
on economic growth, but they consider an AK-type growth model in which economic growth is driven by capital
accumulation. Our study complements their interesting analysis by exploring the e¤ects of labor unions in an
R&D-based growth model of directed technical change.
7An exception is Palokangas (2005), who explores an open economy with unions and international R&D
spillovers; however, he does not consider directed technical change and wage inequality across countries.
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(2001) also considers the relationship between labor unions and directed technical change. They
analyze the endogenous formation of labor unions but take innovation as an exogenous change
in productivity parameters, whereas our study provides a complementary analysis by taking the
existence of labor unions as given and exploring their e¤ects on endogenous directed technical
change.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 provides
analytical results. Section 4 conducts a quantitative analysis. The nal section concludes. Proofs
are relegated to the appendix.
2 The model
In this section, we consider an open-economy version of the R&D-based growth model originated
from the seminal study by Romer (1990).8 In the model, there are two countries: Home and
Foreign. Final goods are produced by combining intermediate goods from the two countries via
a standard CES Armington aggregator. Intermediate goods in each country are produced using
domestic labor and di¤erentiated monopolistic inputs. The number of varieties of these di¤eren-
tiated inputs increases over time as a result of R&D. In each country, there is an economy-wide
labor union that bargains with an economy-wide federation representing employers to determine
wage and employment, which in turn determines the market size of each country. As a result,
changes in employment in a country potentially a¤ect the direction of innovation across countries
as in the model of directed technical change in Acemoglu (1998, 2002).9 The novelty of this study
is that we explore the e¤ects of labor unions in the Acemoglu model and focus on the direction of
innovation across countries instead of sectors.
2.1 Household
In the Home country h, there is a representative household, which has the following lifetime utility
function:
Uh =
1Z
0
e t ln cht dt, (1)
where cht denotes consumption of nal goods at time t, and  > 0 is the subjective discount rate.
The household maximizes utility subject to the following asset-accumulation equation:10
_aht = rta
h
t + w
h
t l
h
t + b
h
t
 
Lh   lht
  ht   cht . (2)
8See also Aghion and Howitt (1992), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Segerstrom et al. (1990) for other
seminal studies on the R&D-based growth model and Gancia and Zilibotti (2005) for a survey of this literature.
9Other inuential studies on directed technical change include Acemoglu (2003), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001),
Gancia and Bonglioli (2008) and Gancia and Zilibotti (2009).
10We also impose the usual no-Ponzi-game condition that requires the households lifetime budget constraint to
be satised.
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aht is the amount of nancial assets (i.e., the equity shares of rms that generate monopolistic
prots) owned by the household in the Home country, and rt is the real interest rate.11 wht is
the wage rate in the Home country. Lh is the inelastic supply of labor, and lht is employment.
Therefore, Lh   lht is unemployment, and the unemployment rate is uht  1   lht =Lh.12 bht is
unemployment benet, and ht is a lump-sum tax levied by the government on the household.
From standard dynamic optimization, the Euler equation is13
_cht
cht
= rt   . (3)
There are analogous conditions and variables with a superscript f in the Foreign country.
2.2 Final goods
The production of nal goods is perfectly competitive, and they are freely traded across countries.14
Final goods are produced with the following CES Armington aggregator:
Yt =
h
(Xht )
(" 1)=" + (1  )(Xft )(" 1)="
i"=(" 1)
, (4)
whereXht andX
f
t are respectively intermediate goods produced in the Home and Foreign countries.
The parameter " > 115 is the Armington elasticity of substitution between the two types of
intermediate goods, and the parameter  2 (0; 1) determines their relative importance. We choose
nal goods as the numeraire, and the standard price index of nal goods is
1 =
h
"
 
P ht
1 "
+ (1  )"(P ft )1 "
i1=(1 ")
, (5)
where we have set the price of nal goods to one. P ht and P
f
t are respectively the price of X
h
t and
Xft . The conditional demand functions for intermediate goods are
Xht =


P ht
"
Yt, (6)
Xft =

1  
P ft
"
Yt. (7)
11rt is not indexed by a country superscript because we consider a global nancial market. Our derivations are
robust to any distribution of nancial assets across the two countries. One special case is that all domestic (foreign)
rms are owned by the domestic (foreign) household.
12In this simple model, unemployment is caused by the union. In the absence of the union, all labor Lh will be
employed by rms.
13Also, the transversality condition requires rt > _aht =a
h
t , which holds on the balanced growth path given the log
utility function and  > 0.
14It is useful to note that we do not impose any restriction on the location of the production of nal goods.
Suppose all nal goods are produced in the Foreign (Home) country. Then, the Home (Foreign) country would
import nal goods and export intermediate goods. The householdsbudget constraints ensure that trade is balanced.
Derivations are available upon request.
15McDaniel and Balistreri (2003) provide a survey of empirical estimates of this Armington elasticity of substi-
tution. Although point estimates vary across studies, they are mostly larger than one.
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2.3 Intermediate goods and labor union
There is a unit continuum of rms producing intermediate goods in each country. The production
function of Xht is given by
Xht = (l
h
t )

Z Nht
0
[xht (i)]
di, (8)
where lht is the employment of labor and x
h
t (i) is di¤erentiated input i 2 [0; Nht ]. We also impose
the following parameter restrictions: ;  2 (0; 1) and  +  < 1. Here we follow the formulation
in Chang et al. (2007) to assume decreasing returns to scale,16 allowing the rms to have positive
prot in order to facilitate the bargaining process between the employersfederation and the labor
union. The prot function of the representative rm is
ht = P
h
t X
h
t   wht lht  
Z Nht
0
pht (i)x
h
t (i)di, (9)
where pht (i) is the price of x
h
t (i). The rm chooses x
h
t (i) to maximize 
h
t . The conditional demand
function for xht (i) is
pht (i) = P
h
t (l
h
t )
[xht (i)]
 1. (10)
Departing from the usual treatment without labor union, we follow previous studies, such as
Palokangas (1996) and Chang et al. (2007), to consider an economy-wide labor union that bargains
with an economy-wide federation representing employers to determine wage wht and employment
lht . We consider a closed shop union under which only union members are eligible for employment.
As in Pemberton (1988) and Chang et al. (2007), we consider a managerial union whose objective
is inuenced by the union leadersdesire for a larger membership and the membersdesire for a
higher wage. Formally, the unions objective is given by a standard Stone-Geary function:17
Oht = (w
h
t   bht )!
h
(lht )
h . (11)
The parameter !h > 0 measures the weight that the union places on workersincremental wage
income from employment (i.e., wage minus unemployment benet). The parameter h > 0 mea-
sures the weight that the union places on membership. For simplicity, we normalize h to unity
and use !h to measure the weight that the union places on wage relative to membership; i.e., we
focus on h = 1 for the rest of the analysis.18 When !h > 1 (!h < 1), we refer to the union as
being wage-oriented (employment-oriented).
The employersfederation and the labor union bargain over wht and l
h
t .
19 The generalized Nash
bargaining function is
max
wht ;l
h
t
Bht = (O
h
t )
h(ht )
1 h , (12)
16This can be justied by the presence of a xed factor input owned by the rms.
17Here we follow Chang et al. (2007) to assume that the union objective function depends only on current wages
and employment. This simplifying assumption allows for a tractable analysis of transition dynamics.
18Our results are robust to h > 0 (derivations available upon request), but some of the expressions become more
complicated in this case.
19In this study, we focus on e¢ cient bargaining. In the case of right-to-manage bargaining (under which the union
and employers bargain over wages only), equilibrium employment and economic growth are unambiguously decreas-
ing in the unions bargaining power, contradicting evidence from some empirical studies (discussed in footnote 2).
Derivations are available upon request.
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where the parameter h 2 (0; 1) measures the bargaining power of the labor union relative to the
employers. The bargaining solutions are
@Bht
@wht
= 0, (w
h
t   bht )lht
ht
=
!hh
1  h , (13)
@Bht
@lht
= 0, w
h
t l
h
t   P ht Xht
ht
=
h
1  h . (14)
There are analogous conditions for wft and l
f
t in the Foreign country.
2.4 Di¤erentiated inputs
In each country, there is a continuum of industries producing di¤erentiated inputs i 2 [0; Nht ]. Each
di¤erentiated input i is produced by a monopolist who owns a patent on the production technology.
For simplicity, we follow Acemoglu (2002) to assume that these di¤erentiated inputs are produced
using nal goods. In particular, one unit of nal goods produces one unit of di¤erentiated input.
The prot function of the monopolist in industry i is given by
ht (i) = p
h
t (i)x
h
t (i)  xht (i) = P ht (lht )[xht (i)]   xht (i), (15)
where the second equality uses (10). Di¤erentiating (15) with respect to xht (i), we nd the familiar
prot-maximizing price of xht (i) given by p
h
t (i) = 1=. Substituting p
h
t (i) = 1= into (10) and (16)
yields
xht (i) = [
2P ht (l
h
t )
]1=(1 )  xht , (16)
ht (i) =

1  


xht (i) =

1  


[2P ht (l
h
t )
]1=(1 )  ht . (17)
There are analogous conditions for xft and 
f
t in the Foreign country.
2.5 R&D
The invention of a new variety of di¤erentiated inputs in either country requires  units of nal
goods. We consider the lab-equipment R&D specication in Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991). In
particular, the innovation process for new varieties in the Home country is given by
_Nht = R
h
t =, (18)
where Rht is the amount of nal goods devoted to R&D in the Home country.
20 Suppose we denote
vht as the value of an invention in the Home country. Free entry in the R&D sector implies
(vht   ) _Nht = 0. (19)
20It is useful to note that we do not impose any restriction on the location of R&D. An inventor in the Home
country may create a new variety for the domestic market or for the foreign market.
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The familiar Bellman equation is
rt =
ht + _v
h
t
vht
, (20)
Intuitively, the Bellman equation equates the interest rate to the asset return per unit of asset,
where the asset return is the monopolistic prot ht plus any potential capital gain _v
h
t . There are
analogous conditions for vft in the Foreign country.
2.6 Government
In each country, there is a government that determines unemployment benet and levies a lump-
sum tax on the household to balance the scal budget. The balanced-budget condition in the
Home country is
ht = b
h
t
 
Lh   lht

. (21)
To be consistent with balanced growth, we assume that unemployment benet bht is proportional
to the value of domestic output P ht X
h
t ; i.e., b
h
t = b
h
P ht X
h
t , where b
h
> 0 is a policy parameter.
There are analogous conditions for  ft and b
f
t in the Foreign country.
2.7 Decentralized equilibrium
An equilibrium is a time path of allocations fcht ; cft ; Yt; Xht ; Xft ; xht (i); xft (i); lht ; lft ; Rht ; Rft g, prices
frt; wht ; wft ; P ht ; P ft ; pht (i); pft (i); vht ; vft g and scal policies fht ;  ft ; bht ; bft g such that the following
conditions hold at each instance of time:
 the representative household in the Home country chooses fcht g to maximize utility taking
frt; wht ; bht ; ht g as given;
 the representative household in the Foreign country chooses fcft g to maximize utility taking
frt; wft ; bft ;  ft g as given;
 perfectly competitive nal-goods rms produce fYtg to maximize prot taking prices fP ht ; P ft g
as given;
 intermediate-goods rms in the Home country produce fXht g to maximize prot taking prices
fP ht ; pht (i)g as given;
 intermediate-goods rms in the Foreign country produce fXft g to maximize prot taking
prices fP ft ; pft (i)g as given;
 in the Home country, an economy-wide federation representing intermediate-goods rms
bargains with an economy-wide labor union to determine fwht ; lht g;
 in the Foreign country, an economy-wide federation representing intermediate-goods rms
bargains with an economy-wide labor union to determine fwft ; lft g;
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 monopolistic rms in the Home country produce di¤erentiated inputs fxht (i)g and set fpht (i)g
to maximize prot;
 monopolistic rms in the Foreign country produce di¤erentiated inputs fxft (i)g and set
fpft (i)g to maximize prot;
 R&D rms choose fRht ; Rft g to maximize prot taking frt; vht ; vft g as given;
 the market-clearing condition for nal goods holds such that Yt = Rht +Rft +Nht xht +N ft xft +
cht + c
f
t ;
 the government in the Home country balances its scal budget given by ht = bht
 
Lh   lht

;
 the government in the Foreign country balances its scal budget given by  ft = bft (Lf   lft ).
Here we rst solve for the equilibrium levels of employment in the two countries. Substituting
(8) and (10) into (9) yields the prot function of intermediate goods in the Home country given
by
ht = (1  )P ht (lht )
Z Nht
0
[xht (i)]
di  wht lht = (1  )P ht Xht   wht lht . (22)
Substituting (22) into the bargaining solution in (14) yields
wht l
h
t =

 + h(1    )P ht (lht ) Z Nht
0
[xht (i)]
di =

 + h(1    )P ht Xht , (23)
where labor income share wht l
h
t =P
h
t X
h
t = + 
h(1    ) is increasing in the unions bargaining
power h. Then, substituting (23) into (22) yields
ht = (1  h)(1    )P ht (lht )
Z Nht
0
[xht (i)]
di = (1  h)(1    )P ht Xht . (24)
Substituting (23), (24) and bht = b
h
P ht X
h
t into the bargaining solution in (13) yields the equilibrium
level of employment in the Home country given by
lht =
 + (1  !h)h(1    )
b
h
 lh, (25)
where employment lh is decreasing in the unions wage orientation !h and is ambiguous with
respect to its bargaining power h depending on the value of !h. We impose parameter restrictions
to ensure lht 2 (0; Lh). By analogous inference, the equilibrium level of employment in the Foreign
country is given by
lft =
 + (1  !f )f (1    )
b
f
 lf . (26)
We also impose parameter restrictions to ensure lft 2 (0; Lf ). Equations (25) and (26) give
the equilibrium levels of employment flh; lfg regardless of whether the economy is on or o¤ the
balanced growth path.
9
Next we derive the relative wage across countries. Combining (6) and (7) yields the relative
demand function for intermediate goods given by
P ht
P ft
=

1  

Xht
Xft
 1="
. (27)
Substituting (16) into (8) yields the production of intermediate goods Xht given by
Xht = (l
h)=(1 )(2P ht )
=(1 )Nht . (28)
Substituting (28) and the analogous condition for Xft into (27) yields
P ht
P ft
=


1  
 (1 )"
+(1 )"

lh
lf
  
+(1 )" Nht
N ft
  (1 )
+(1 )"
, (29)
which determines the relative price ofXht andX
f
t . Substituting (16) into (23) yields the equilibrium
wage rate in the Home country given by
wht = 
2=(1 )  + h(1    ) (P ht )1=(1 )(lh)  1  1  Nht . (30)
Combining (30) and the analogous expression for wft yields an expression for relative wage across
countries. If we substitute the relative price in (29) into this expression, we would obtain the
equilibrium relative wage given by
wht
wft
=
 + h(1    )
 + f (1    )


1  
 "
+(1 )"

lh
lf
 ++(1  )"
+(1 )" Nht
N ft
 (1 )(" 1)
+(1 )"
, (31)
which is decreasing in relative employment lh=lf but increasing in relative technology Nht =N
f
t .
Equation (31) gives the equilibrium relative wage regardless of whether the economy is on or o¤
the balanced growth path. Proposition 1 characterizes the dynamic property of Nht =N
f
t .
Proposition 1 There is a unique and globally stable steady-state equilibrium value of Nht =N
f
t .
When Nht =N
f
t is below (above) this steady-state value, N
h
t =N
f
t increases (decreases) until N
h
t =N
f
t
reaches the steady state, at which point Nht and N
f
t grow at the same rate.
Proof. See the appendix.
We now derive the steady-state equilibrium value of Nht =N
f
t . In the long run, innovation takes
place in both countries; therefore, we have vht = , which in turn implies that _v
h
t = 0. Substituting
_vht = 0 into (20), we obtain the equilibrium value of an invention in the Home country given by
vh =
h
r
=

1  


[2P h(lh)]1=(1 )
r
, (32)
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where the second equality follows from (17). Combining (32) with the analogous expression for
vf , we obtain the relative value of inventions across countries given by
vh
vf
=

P h
P f
1=(1 )
lh
lf
=(1 )
= 1, (33)
where the second equality follows from vh = vf = . Combining (29) and (33) yields the steady-
state equilibrium value of Nht =N
f
t given by
Nht
N ft
=


1  
"
lh
lf
(" 1)
, (34)
which is increasing in relative employment lh=lf capturing the market-size e¤ect on the direction
of innovation across countries. We substitute (34) into (31) to derive the steady-state equilibrium
relative wage given by
wht
wft
=
 + h(1    )
 + f (1    )


1  
"
lh
lf
(" 1) 1
, (35)
which is increasing in relative employment lh=lf if and only if the substitution elasticity " is greater
than (1 + )=.
2.8 Economic growth and social welfare
In Lemma 1, we derive the steady-state equilibrium growth rate, which is monotonically increasing
in the equilibrium levels of employment flh; lfg. Therefore, whenever labor unions a¤ect employ-
ment, they also a¤ect economic growth in the same way.
Lemma 1 The steady-state equilibrium growth rate of consumption is given by
g =
(1  )(1+)=(1 )

h
"
 
lh
(" 1)
+ (1  )"  lf(" 1)i 1(1 )(" 1)   . (36)
Proof. See the appendix.
Using (1), we can express the representative households lifetime welfare on the balanced growth
path as
U j =
1


ln cj0 +
g


, (37)
where j 2 fh; fg and we have dened t = 0 as the time when the economy reaches the balanced
growth path. To derive the balanced-growth level of consumption in each country, we need to make
an assumption on the distribution of assets across countries. Following the standard treatment
in the literature,21 we assume home bias in asset holding under which domestic (foreign) rms
are owned by the domestic (foreign) household. Under this assumption, Lemma 2 derives the
following expression for ln cj0 and U
j, where the term N j0 in (38) is determined by (34).
21See for example Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010).
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Lemma 2 Under home bias in asset holding, the steady-state welfare function is given by
U j =
1


lnN j0 + ln



[(1 + ) + g]

+
g


. (38)
Proof. See the appendix.
Equation (38) shows that welfare U j is increasing in the equilibrium growth rate and in the
balanced-growth level of technology N j0 . In this model, when the economy is on a transition path,
new varieties are created only for one country until the economy reaches the new balanced growth
path along which Nht and N
f
t grow at the same rate. In other words, whenever the steady-state
value of Nht =N
f
t increases (decreases), it must be the case that _N
h
t > 0 and _N
f
t = 0 ( _N
h
t = 0 and
_N ft > 0) during transition.
3 Macroeconomic e¤ects of labor unions
In this section, we explore the macroeconomic implications of labor unions. In particular, we are
interested in the e¤ects of a labor union becoming more wage oriented (i.e., !h increases) and
having more bargaining power relative to employers (i.e., h increases). In Section 3.1, we analyze
the e¤ects of increasing !h.22 In Section 3.2, we analyze the e¤ects of increasing h.
3.1 Wage orientation of labor unions
Equation (25) shows that an increase in the unions wage orientation !h leads to a decrease in
employment lh in the Home country. Intuitively, as the union in the Home country becomes more
wage oriented, it demands a higher wage and depresses labor demand. Given that employment
lf in the Foreign country is independent of !h, an increase in !h leads to a decrease in relative
employment lh=lf , which in turn increases relative wage wht =w
f
t across countries in the short run
(i.e., for a given Nht =N
f
t ) as shown in (31). This short-run increase in relative wage is partly due
to the direct e¤ect of the decrease in relative employment and partly due to an indirect e¤ect
via the increase in relative price P ht =P
f
t as shown in (29). In the long run, N
h
t =N
f
t decreases to
a lower steady-state value as shown in (34) because the decrease in relative employment lh=lf
changes the relative market size of the two countries and causes innovation to be directed towards
the Foreign country. This negative market-size e¤ect partly o¤sets and may even dominate the
positive price e¤ect on relative wage wht =w
f
t . Equation (35) shows that the overall e¤ect of !
h
on wht =w
f
t would be negative if and only if the substitution elasticity " is su¢ ciently large (i.e.,
" > (1 + )=). From Lemma 1, we see that the decrease in employment also reduces economic
growth in the long run. Furthermore, Nht =N
f
t decreasing to a lower steady-state value implies
_Nht = 0 and _N
f
t > 0 until the economy reaches the new balanced growth path. Therefore, the
increase in !h also reduces state-state welfare in the Home country due to the lower growth rate,
but the welfare e¤ect in the Foreign country is ambiguous due to the opposing e¤ects of g and N f0
22The e¤ects of increasing unemployment benet b
h
are the same as increasing !h.
12
on U f in (38). We summarize these results in Proposition 2. Figure 2 plots the transitional path
of wht =w
f
t in response to a permanent increase in !
h at time t.
Proposition 2 As the labor union becomes more wage oriented, employment in the domestic
economy decreases. This decrease in employment increases the wage rate in the domestic economy
relative to the foreign economy in the short run. In the long run, the decrease in employment
in the domestic economy causes innovation to be directed to the foreign economy, which causes
a negative e¤ect on the relative wage. The overall e¤ect on the relative wage in the long run is
negative if and only if the substitution elasticity " is greater than a threshold given by (1 + )=.
Finally, the e¤ects on the steady-state growth rate and domestic welfare are negative.
Proof. See the appendix.
Figure 2
3.2 Bargaining power of labor unions
In this subsection, we rst consider the case of a wage-oriented union (i.e., !h > 1). Equation
(25) shows that an increase in the unions bargaining power h leads to a decrease in employment
lh if and only if the union is wage oriented. This decrease in employment lh has a positive e¤ect
on the wage rate in the Home country as shown in (30). Furthermore, an increase in the unions
bargaining power increases the share of output that goes to wage income as shown in (23). These
two positive e¤ects on wht lead to an unambiguous increase in relative wage w
h
t =w
f
t in the short run
(i.e., for a given Nht =N
f
t ) as shown in (31). However, in the long run, the decrease in employment
lh exerts a negative market-size e¤ect on wht =w
f
t by decreasing N
h
t =N
f
t . This negative market-size
e¤ect would dominate the abovementioned positive e¤ects if the elasticity of substitution between
Home and Foreign intermediate goods is su¢ ciently large; i.e.,23
" > 1 +
!h
!h   1

1
 + h(1    )

 ".
23It is useful to note that " > (1 + )= given an upper bound imposed on !h to ensure lh > 0 in (25).
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The transitional path of wht =w
f
t in response to an increase in !
h is similar to Figure 2, except that
the threshold of " is now given by " instead of (1 + )=. Lemma 1 shows that the decrease in
employment also reduces economic growth in the long run. Together with the decrease in Nht =N
f
t ,
steady-state welfare in the Home country decreases, but the welfare e¤ect in the Foreign country
is ambiguous due to the opposing e¤ects of g and N f0 on U
f in (38). We summarize these results
in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 When a wage-oriented union has more bargaining power, employment in the do-
mestic economy decreases. This decrease in employment increases the wage rate in the domestic
economy relative to the foreign economy in the short run. In the long run, the decrease in em-
ployment in the domestic economy causes innovation to be directed to the foreign economy, which
causes a negative e¤ect on the relative wage. The overall long-run e¤ect of increasing a wage-
oriented unions bargaining power on the relative wage is negative if and only if the substitution
elasticity " is greater than a threshold given by " in (37). Finally, the e¤ects on the steady-state
growth rate and domestic welfare are negative.
Proof. See the appendix.
Next we consider an employment-oriented union (i.e., !h < 1). In this case, (25) shows that
an increase in the unions bargaining power h raises employment lh in the domestic economy.
Although this increase in employment causes a negative e¤ect on relative wage wht =w
f
t as shown in
(31), the increase in h nevertheless increases relative wage wht =w
f
t in the short run. This positive
short-run e¤ect of !h on relative wage wht =w
f
t is due to the increase in the share of output that
goes to wage income as shown in (23). As for the long-run e¤ect of the unions bargaining power
h on relative wage wht =w
f
t , an increase in 
h further increases relative wage under an employment-
oriented union because the market-size e¤ect (by increasing Nht =N
f
t ) works in favor of increasing
wht =w
f
t due to the increase in employment l
h. Lemma 1 shows that this increase in employment
also stimulates economic growth in the long run. Together with the increase in Nht =N
f
t , steady-
state welfare in the Home country increases. In this case, the welfare e¤ect in the Foreign country
is also positive due to the positive e¤ect of g on U f in (38). We summarize these results in
Proposition 4. Figure 3 plots the transitional path of wht =w
f
t in response to a permanent increase
in the bargaining power h of an employment-oriented union at time t.
Proposition 4 When an employment-oriented union has more bargaining power, employment in
the domestic economy increases. This increase in employment causes a negative e¤ect on the wage
rate in the domestic economy. However, the increase in the unions bargaining power also increases
the share of output that goes to labor income. The overall e¤ect on the relative wage is positive
in the short run. In the long run, the increase in employment causes innovation to be directed to
the domestic economy, which leads to an additional positive e¤ect on the relative wage. Therefore,
the overall long-run e¤ect of increasing an employment-oriented unions bargaining power on the
relative wage is always positive. Finally, the e¤ects on the steady-state growth rate and welfare in
both countries are positive.
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Proof. See the appendix.
Figure 3
4 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we calibrate our model to data in the US and the UK to see if it can replicate
the simultaneous decrease in labor income share and unemployment in Figure 1. In particular, we
assume that the decrease in labor income share is due to a decrease in workersbargaining power
fh; fg.24 Then, we compute the implied values of the unionswage orientation f!h; !fg that
enable the model to deliver the observed decrease in the unemployment rates in the two countries.
Finally, we also explore the quantitative implications on social welfare and wage inequality across
the two countries.
The model features the following parameters f; "; ; ; ; ; Lh; Lf ; bh; bf ; !h; !f ; h; fg. We
dene the US as the Home country h and the UK as the Foreign country f . We follow Acemoglu
and Akcigit (2012) to consider a standard value for the discount rate  = 0:05. As for the elasticity
of substitution between Home and Foreign intermediate goods, we set " to 3.5, which takes on
an intermediate value of the empirical estimates summarized in McDaniel and Balistreri (2003).
For the parameters in the intermediate-goods production function (8), we set the degree of labor
intensity  to 0.5 and the intensity of intermediate goods  to 0.2. It is useful to recall that labor
income share is given by  + h(1      ) in the model. Therefore,  is the lower bound of
labor income share, and 1    is the upper bound. Given that labor income share has fallen to
as low as 0.54 in the US in recent years, we consider labor income share bounded between 0.5
and 0.8 to be reasonable. As for the R&D productivity parameter , we calibrate it using the
long-run average growth rate in the two economies, and g is about 2%. As for the share parameter
 in the nal-goods production function (4), we calibrate it using the relative wage of the two
24For example, Kristal (2013) uses industry-level data to show that the decrease in labor income share in the US
since the early 1980s is due to the decrease in unionization and workersbargaining power; see also Kristal (2010)
and Judzik and Sala (2013) for evidence based on country-level data from a sample of countries including the UK
and the US.
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countries, and wht =w
f
t is 1.45 in 1980.
25 We calibrate the policy parameters fbh; bfg using data
on the average value of unemployment benets as a share of GDP in each of the two countries.26
To match the unemployment rates in the early 1980s, we calibrate the values of fLh; Lfg.27 We
use the trend values of labor income share in the two countries in 1980 and 2007 to calibrate
respectively the values of fh; fg in 1980 and 2007. Finally, we calibrate the values of f!h; !fg
so that the calibrated economies replicate the observed decrease in the unemployment rates from
8% to 5% in the US and from 10% to 5% in the UK. Table 1 summarizes the calibrated parameter
values.
Table 1: Calibrated parameter values
 "     Lh Lf b
h
b
f
!h !f h f
0:05 3:5 0:5 0:2 7:1 0:51 136:5 48:7 0:38% 0:88% 1:14 1:71 0:53! 0:17 0:53! 0:43
Figure 1a shows that labor income shares in the US and the UK were about the same at 0.66
in 1980. By 2007, labor income share in the US falls to 0.55, whereas labor income share in the
UK decreases only slightly to 0.63. Our model provides the following structural interpretation
of this empirical pattern: the bargaining power of workers falls by a much larger degree in the
US than in the UK, as indicated in Table 1. Figure 1b shows that unemployment rates in the
two countries fall to a similar value of 5%. The fact that unemployment decreases in response
to a decrease in the bargaining power of workers implies that unions are wage-oriented (i.e.,
f!h; !fg > 1).28 Furthermore, the degree of wage orientation must be larger in the UK in order
for its unemployment rate to fall by a larger magnitude despite the smaller decrease in its workers
bargaining power. Table 1 shows that the degree of wage orientation !f in the UK is 1.71, which is
larger than !h = 1:14 in the US. Under these values of f!h; !fg, decreasing the unions bargaining
power h from 0.53 to 0.17 causes the unemployment rate to decrease from 8% to 5% in the US,
whereas decreasing f from 0.53 to 0.43 causes the unemployment rate to decrease from 10% to
5% in the UK.
In the rest of this section, we simulate the e¤ects of decreasing unions bargaining power
fh; fg on relative wage in (35) and welfare in (38). We consider the calibrated parameter values
and changes in fh; fg in Table 1. The decrease in unionsbargaining power fh; fg leads to
an increase in employment flh; lfg, which in turn increases the long-run growth rate from 2% to
2.16%.29 This positive growth e¤ect benets the two countries equally. However, the decrease in
lh=lf (recall that unemployment falls by more in the UK than in the US) causes innovation to be
directed to the UK and gives rise to a decrease in Nh=N f . Figure 4 plots the time series of Nht =N
f
t
and shows that Nht =N
f
t decreases to a lower value from 1980 to 2007. We construct this time
series using data on patent grants by the United States Patent and Trademark O¢ ce (USPTO)
25Data source: Penn World Table, and OECD Annual Indicators on Unit Labour Costs.
26Data source: OECD Dataset on Social Expenditure.
27The calibrated value of 2.8 for Lh=Lf is slightly less than the relative labor-force size of about 4 in the 1980s.
28In the case of employment-oriented unions, decreasing their bargaining power would lead to lower employment
and higher unemployment.
29For example, Carmeci and Mauro (2003) estimate dynamic panel regressions using data on OECD countries
and nd that decreasing labor union density indeed has a positive e¤ect on long-run growth.
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and European Patent O¢ ce (EPO).30 Specically, we use the number of patents granted by the
USPTO to inventors in the US and the UK from 1977 to 2007 to obtain a time series for the ow
_Nht .
31 Then, we compute the accumulated stock of patents granted by the USPTO to construct
a time series for the stock Nht . Similarly, we use the number of patents granted by the EPO to
inventors in the US and the UK each year to obtain a time series for _N ft .
32 Then, we compute the
accumulated stock of patents granted by the EPO to construct a time series for N ft .
Figure 4
The decrease in Nh=N f a¤ects the two countries di¤erently due to changes in relative wage
income. In the data, relative wage wht =w
f
t decreases from 1.45 in 1980 to 1.03 in 2007,
33 whereas
wht =w
f
t decreases from 1.45 to 1.26 in our simulation, which explains about half of the decrease
in relative wage in the data. Finally, we also simulate the welfare changes in the two countries.34
We nd that as a result of the increase in employment and growth, welfare improves in the US,
and the welfare gain is equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption of 5.35%. The welfare
improvement in the UK is even more signicant at 8.29% due to the increase in wage income
relative to the US. We summarize these results in Table 2.
30Data source: OECD patent databases.
31Earlier data is not available.
32Unfortunately, we do not have data on patent grants by inventorsresidence of origin at the Intellectual Property
O¢ ce in the UK, so we use data from the EPO as a proxy.
33From the Penn World Table, we obtain PPP-adjusted real income per worker. Then, we use OECD data on
labor income share to compute real wage income per worker in the two countries. OECD also provides direct data
on average annual wages, according to which relative wage of the two countries decreases from 1.30 in 1990 to 1.17
in 2007; unfortunately, earlier data is not available.
34We express welfare changes as the usual equivalent variation in annual consumption.
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Table 2: Simulated e¤ects on fwht =wft ; Uh; U fg
Data Model
Relative wage between the US and the UK in 1980 1:45 1:45
Relative wage between the US and the UK in 2007 1:03 1:26
Welfare changes in the US n=a 5:35%
Welfare changes in the UK n=a 8:29%
5 Conclusion
In this study, we have explored the macroeconomics e¤ects of labor unions in an open-economy
model of directed technical change. We nd that the e¤ects of labor unions on employment,
innovation and economic growth are theoretically ambiguous and depend on their wage orientation.
In the case of the US and the UK, wage-oriented unions seem to t the data better by enabling the
model to replicate the observed decrease in labor income share, unemployment and relative wage
across countries. In this case, decreasing the bargaining power of unions stimulates employment
and economic growth, as some empirical studies (discussed in the introduction) tend to nd.
However, in other cases, decreasing the bargaining power of unions could reduce employment and
growth if the unions are employment-oriented instead. These theoretical ndings suggest that
there is no one-size-ts-all policy when it comes to reforming existing labor market institutions,
such as labor unions, and policymakers should make an e¤ort to understand the country-specic
or even industry-specic e¤ects of labor unions.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. If Nht =N
f
t is smaller than its unique steady-state value in (34) (i.e.,
Nht =N
f
t < [=(1  )]"
 
lh=lf
(" 1)  ), then ht > ft must hold, and hence, vht = vft =  cannot
hold, noting (17) and (29). In fact, one can show that so long as Nht =N
f
t < ; 
h
t =rt = v
h
t =  and
vft < , implying _N
h
t > 0 and _N
f
t = 0. Following Acemoglu (1998) and Acemoglu and Zilibotti
(2001), we have demonstrated that only one type of innovation takes place o¤ the steady state.
Furthermore, the economy converges to the steady state and arrives there in nite time. In the
steady state, Nht =N
f
t is constant over time implying that N
h
t and N
f
t grow at the same rate. An
analogous argument can be applied to the case of Nht =N
f
t > .
Proof of Lemma 1. By (32) and vh = ; the interest rate is given by
r =
h

=

1  

 
2P h
 
lh
1=(1 )

. (A1)
Using (A1), the Euler equation (3) becomes
_cht
cht
=

1  

 
2P h
 
lh
1=(1 )

    g. (A2)
(5) can be rewritten as
P h =
h
" + (1  )"  P h=P f" 1i 1" 1 . (A3)
Substituting (34) into (29) leads to P h=P f =
 
lh=lf
 
. Applying this to (A3) and substituting
the resulting expression into (A2), we can obtain (36).
Proof of Lemma 2. Under the assumption of home bias in asset holding, one can rewrite (2)
as
vht _N
h
t = rtv
h
tN
h
t + 
h
t + w
h
t l
h
t   cht , (A4)
where vht =  and hence _v
h
t = 0. On the balanced growth path, we can solve (A4) for c
h
t :
cht = 
h
tN
h
t + 
h
t + w
h
t l
h
t   gNht , (A5)
using rtvht = 
h
t and _N
h
t = gN
h
t . Using (17), we obtain
htN
h
t = 
(1+)=(1 ) (1  ) (lh)P h 11  Nht . (A6)
Here it holds that
(lh)P h =
h
"(lh)(" 1) + (1  )"  lf(" 1)i 1" 1 =   (g + )
(1+)=(1 ) (1  )
1 
, (A7)
where the rst equality comes from (A3) with P h=P f =
 
lh=lf
 
and the second equality comes
from (36). Using (23) and (24), we obtain
ht + w
h
t l
h
t = (1  )P ht Xht = 2=(1 )

(lh)P h
1=(1 )
Nht , (A8)
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where we have used (28) for the second equality. Substituting (A6)-(A8) into (A5) yields
cht = 

(1 + ) + g


Nht . (A9)
Substituting (A9) into (38) yields (39). Finally, cft can be derived analogously.
Proof of Proposition 2. It is shown in (25) that an increase in !h causes a decrease in
employment lh, which increases wht =w
f
t in the short run (i.e., taking N
h
t =N
f
t as given) through
(31). In the long run, the decrease in lh reduces Nht =N
f
t (i.e., innovation to be directed towards
the Foreign country) given " > 1; see (34). Finally, as shown in (35), this results in a reduction in
wht =w
f
t if and only if ("  1) > 1; which is equivalent to " > (1 + )=. Finally, for the e¤ect of
!h on long-run growth, use Lemma 1. For the e¤ect on domestic welfare, use Lemma 2 and note
the decrease in g together with _Nht = 0 and _N
f
t > 0 on the transitional path to the new steady
state of Nht =N
f
t , which is lower than before.
Proof of Proposition 3. Under a wage-oriented union, we have !h > 1. We rst address the
short run by taking Nht =N
f
t as given in (31). Using this fact and (25), we can rewrite (31) as
ln(wht =w
f
t ) = ln[+
h(1  )]   +  + (1    )"
 + (1  )" ln

 + (1  !h)h(1    ) , (A10)
where we have omitted some exogenous terms for simplicity. Di¤erentiating (A10) yields
@ ln(wht =w
f
t )
@h
=
1    
 + h(1    ) +
 +  + (1    )"
 + (1  )"
(!h   1)(1    )
 + (1  !h)h(1    ) , (A11)
which is positive given !h > 1. In the rest of this proof, we address the long run by considering
(35). In an analogous manner, we can derive from (35)
ln(wht =w
f
t ) = ln[ + 
h(1    )] + [("  1)  1] ln  + (1  !h)h(1    ) , (A12)
where some exogenous terms are omitted again for simplicity. Di¤erentiating (A12) yields
@ ln(wht =w
f
t )
@h
=
1    
 + h(1    )   [("  1)  1]
(!h   1)(1    )
 + (1  !h)h(1    ) . (A13)
From (A13), it can be shown that @ ln(wht =w
f
t )=@
h < 0 if and only if (37) holds. Finally, for the
e¤ect of h on long-run growth, use Lemma 1. For the e¤ect on domestic welfare, use Lemma 2
as in the proof for Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 4. Under an employment-oriented union, we have !h < 1. First, we con-
sider the short-run e¤ect by examining (A10) and (A11). In (A11), @ ln(wht =w
f
t )=@
h is monotoni-
cally increasing in !h and takes a strictly positive value at !h = 0. Therefore, @ ln(wht =w
f
t )=@
h is
always positive for any !h > 0. Then, we examine the long-run e¤ect using (A13). If (" 1) > 1,
then @ ln(wht =w
f
t )=@
h > 0 must hold because !h < 1. If ("   1) < 1, then @ ln(wht =wft )=@h in
(A13) is monotonically increasing in !h and takes a strictly positive value at !h = 0. Therefore,
@ ln(wht =w
f
t )=@
h is always positive for any !h 2 (0; 1). Finally, for the e¤ect of h on long-run
growth, use Lemma 1. For the e¤ects on domestic and foreign welfare, use Lemma 2 and note the
increase in g together with _Nht > 0 and _N
f
t = 0 on the transitional path to the new steady state
of Nht =N
f
t ; which is higher than before.
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